

## Local Diagnostic of Security 2016. Lubumbashi and Mbujimayi

### Executive Summary

The local diagnostic of security analyses crime in three communes of Lubumbashi (Kampemba, Annexe and Rwashi) and two communes of Mbujimayi (Bipemba and Muya). The main data source comes from a victimization survey conducted during March and April 2016 by Coginta and the universities of Lubumbashi and Mbujimayi totaling 6'000 interviews. While the commune of Rwashi is control zone for a later impact study, the others are pilot communes for the introduction of the *police de proximité* gradually introduced in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The project is supported by the International Organization for Migration with funds from the Governments of the United States of America and Canada. The diagnostic of security establishes a baseline by measuring a series of key indicators of security and its analyses will allow the newly established Local Councils for Security of Proximity (CLSP) in the four pilot communes to draft local plans of prevention.

### **Criminality**

3-year burglary rates fluctuate between 28.8% in Annexe (Lubumbashi) and 35.6% à Muya (Mbujimayi). The city of Mbujimayi has slightly higher rates of burglary (35.3%) than the city of Lubumbashi (32.7%). For assaults, the reverse is true: 3-year assault rates are lower in Mbujimayi (9.2%) than in Lubumbashi (10.5%).

In both cities, criminality takes place mostly during the night. About 4 out of 5 burglaries are committed during night time. In Annexe, over 8 of 10 assaults also took place during the night. However, in Mbujimayi, a sizable number of assaults take also place during the day (about 40%).

Criminality is closely linked to urbanism. In Lubumbashi, the diagnostic uncovered that higher-income areas witness less crime. Medium-income neighborhoods with strong social ties have moderate rates of criminality.

Crime tend to concentrate in low-income areas, informal dwellings with large immigrant populations, poor social cohesion, and, in the case of Lubumbashi, situated mostly in southern and eastern belt of the city.

### **Sense of insecurity**

The sense of insecurity peaks after dark. In all communes, about 4 of 5 respondents feel unsafe walking alone in the streets of their neighborhood at night. During the day, the situation looks far better even though, in Mbujimayi especially, there still is a sizable portion of residents who feel unsafe in their neighborhood: 17.9% in Bipemba and 21.4% in Muya. The sense of insecurity is the highest in informal low-income neighborhoods during the day.

Residents of all communes studied attribute lower-than-average grades to security in their neighborhood. While in Lubumbashi a majority thinks the security situation is stable, in Mbujimayi the trend is negative: 46.9% of Bipemba residents and 43.7% Muya believe security deteriorated during the past 12 months.

### **Reporting to the police**

Urban victims rarely report crimes. In Muya, where reporting rates reach a low, 66.2% of burglary victims never report the crime; this is also true for 57.3% of assaults and 73.7% of sexual assaults. When victims decide to report a crime, they may not report to the police.

In fact, the diagnostic shows that reporting to the police is an exception rather than the rule. Rates fluctuate between 12.6% in Bipemba and 18% in Annexe for burglaries. The reporting rates to the police are slightly higher for assaults. Everywhere, they remain however under 20%.

Victims, in general, prefer to report to *chefs de quartiers* (local authorities at neighborhood level). This is particularly the case in Mbujimayi. In the commune of Bipemba, in 66.9% of the cases the victim of a burglary reports the case to the *chef de quartier*. 60.1% of burglary victims of Muya do the same.

Low reporting rates to the police can be explained by a poor image of the police, lack of trust in its capability and high levels of dissatisfaction with

policing handling of complaints. In Muya, for instance, 11.7% only of victims who reported a burglary to the police considered the police did a good job handling their case. Victims in Lubumbashi are highly irritated by the fact that police charges for registering a complaint in total disregard to the fact that access to justice is free in DRC. In Mbujimayi, where money is less involved in police complaint registration, victims complain that police did not catch criminals and showed little interest in their case.

### **Crime prevention**

With relatively high levels of criminality and fearing crime, residents adopt frequently individual or collective strategies to prevent crime.

Collective action is most popular in Mbujimayi. Often under the leadership of the *chefs de quartier*, residents organize alarm systems (whistles, tam-tam) to alert the neighborhood of the presence of criminals or they organize youth groups to monitor and patrol the area during night-time. 45.1% of residents in Mbujimayi participate to one or another of such collective crime prevention programs.

In Lubumbashi, collective action is the exception. Residents tend to adopt more individual measures aiming at hardening the target of criminals. In high-income neighborhoods, walls are erected around the house to prohibit unwanted access. Low-income neighborhoods are more vulnerable to burglary as resources are lacking to adopt individually such costly measures and, as mentioned earlier, lower levels of social cohesion due to recent immigration prevent people to organize themselves collectively.

### **Policing**

The doctrine of the *police de proximité* has been adopted by the Congolese National Police (PNC) in December 2010. To measure the degree of local implementation of the doctrine, the diagnostic constructed an index-like synthetic indicator using several dimensions of policing. Based on resident perceptions of these dimensions, the commune of Rwashi, Lubumbashi, obtains the highest score (43.9 points of a total of 100). The lowest score is achieved by the police in Bipemba, Mbujimayi (38.9).

While residents agree in general that the police has a fair knowledge of the terrain, the police fare poorly on all other counts. Rapid intervention and crime prevention are the main weaknesses with over 68% of negative opinion. A majority thinks that police patrol unfrequently the area, are not fair, and are distant to the public.

Consequently, the image of the police is rather poor. Annexe, with only 32.8% of positive opinion, trails behind the other communes. The police of Rwashi fare better than all with 43.4% of positive opinion.

In Lubumbashi, residents assess policing as stable, not better but also not worse. Not so in Mbuji-Mayi where 45.7% of Bipemba and 43.4% of Muya consider that the quality of the police has declined over the past 12 months.

### **Gender, security and sexual violence**

Female residents of Lubumbashi do not consider security as top priority issue; only 18.4% of them against 28.4% of men ranked security first. For women, access to electricity (27.5%) and access to water (23.2%) are more pressing concerns. In Mbuji-Mayi, however, insecurity is the most salient issue. As assaults affect more women than men in this city, security tops the list of concerns for 32.1% of women and for 29% of men.

Rates of sexual violence peak in two communes: 8.2% of women were victim of sexual violence in the past three years in Annexe and 7.8% in Rwashi.

Elsewhere, rates are much lower: 1.8% in Muya and 3.3% in Bipemba in the city of Mbuji-Mayi. The exceptional rates in Annexe translate into fear. 85.3% of females declare fearing being the target of sexual violence.

Female victims generally refrain from reporting crime. This is the case in 50% of burglaries, 43.8% of assaults and 64.8% of sexual assaults. Victimized females report less to the police than men and more to the *chefs de quartier*. On average, 44.8% of reported burglaries are reported by females to the *chefs de quartier* while only 18.1% of complaints are addressed to the police.

Public opinion regarding how police address sexual violence is slightly more positive in Mbuji-Mayi than in Lubumbashi. In Annexe, where rates of sexual violence are the highest, only 21.4% of residents think the police do a good job

in this matter. Female respondents are the least positive. Only 17.7% of them believe the Annexe police do a good job addressing sexual violence. 11.1% of females who reported their case to the police found the services offered satisfactory.

None of the female victims reported their case to an NGO as civil society has mostly discontinued its services to female victims due to lack of funding.

### **Security and the *chefs de quartier***

Despite their lack of judicial powers but as extension of their key role in solving local civil disputes, the *chefs de quartier* prove to be a primary actor in public security. They are the principal recipients of complaints. In Mbujimayi, they receive 75.3% of formal complaints for burglaries while the police receive only 20.6% of them. Even in Lubumbashi, where their role in public security is less prominent, they receive more complaints (42.4%) than the police (27.3%) for burglaries.

The *chefs de quartier* are also at the forefront to organize collective mechanisms of alarm and self-defense groups. When a resident participate to such a system, he or she is also 1.72 time more likely to report crime to the *chefs de quartier*. The *chefs de quartier* appear thus to enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, to take initiatives in public security, and to be well-informed about the local security situation. By handling cases, the reproduce social cohesion as they use mostly mediation to solve cases reported to them by somewhat marginalized social groups. Indeed, those who report to the *chef de quartier* are mostly females, older generations, the poorest and the less educated.

### **Annexe (Lubumbashi)**

Situated at the periphery of Lubumbashi, the belt commune of Annexe and its large *quartiers* have witnessed an extremely rapid demographic growth recently. One out of two residents (46.4%) have arrived during the past three years in the commune. Higher-income households occupy the western and north-western part of the belt. Elsewhere, poverty dominates and large parts of residential areas are informal, lacking roads and access to services.

Criminality and incivilities concentrate in the southern and eastern parts of the commune. Drugs and aggressive youth gangs create insecurity and people tend to feel unsafe in the streets. Respectively 19.1% and 17.1% of residents of the southern neighborhoods of Kasungami and Kisanga feel unsafe during the day walking the streets of their neighborhood. In Kalebuka, another southern neighborhood, people rate security at a very low 2.76 on a 10-point scale.

After dark, insecurity gains all neighborhoods including the high-income ones in the west and northern part of the commune that are the theater of frequent armed robberies.

Sexual violence are frequent in the commune and affect most neighborhoods. Munua (12.5%), Kisanga (7.1%), Luwuwoshi (11.1%) and Naviundu (9%) display however higher than average rates. Female residents express deep concern over this phenomenon and 82.6% of them are not satisfied with how the police address the matter.

Expanding quickly, these new urban territories are poorly covered by police services. There are few foot patrols, no police car to intervene rapidly when called for an urgency, no dedicated police communication network, and, as a rule, compliance with the doctrine of *police de proximité* is low with the exception of two neighborhoods: Kalebuka and Kasapa.

The security situation is worse in the southern informal neighborhoods (Kalebuka, Kasungami, Kisanga) where over 60% of the population thinks it further deteriorated over the past 12 months. In these neighborhoods, the dominant opinion is that no institution is able to ensure protection the area. Confidence in the police being low, few residents express the wish to have more police. The main solutions for security, so the residents, are more public light (37%) and more police stations across the territory (13.4%). Only 4.6% consider that increasing the number of police is a solution.

### **Kampemba (Lubumbashi)**

Criminality is high in this industrial commune of Lubumbashi. It concentrates mainly in informal dwellings that were built on the historical no-man's-land that once separated the original white colonial city and the black city (Rwashi). The neighborhoods of Kigoma, parts of Kabetsha, and Bogonga as well as the



southern *quartier* of Kampemba display the highest rates of criminality and incivilities. These *quartiers* are affected by insalubrity and occasional waves of cholera; lots have never been registered formally; they have few or none public schools and sport areas to occupy a sizable portion of unemployed youths. They cumulate problems of crime, drugs, alcohol, and youth gangs.

Policing and the *police de proximité* fare better in high-income neighborhoods, but not systematically. If residential areas such as Hewa Bora and Bel Air 1 are well served by the police, this is not the case of Bel Air 2, another higher-income area. Comparatively, low-income areas fare poorly in terms of policing. In Kigoma, Bogonga and Kampemba, the police does not comply with standards of *police de proximité*. There, the police obtain low marks in visibility, proximity, and fairness.

In the informal dwellings of Kigoma and Bogonga, but also in Hewa Bora and Kafubu, over 40% of residents are of the opinion that the quality of policing declined over the past 12 months. In most of these areas, the trust in the police as provider of security is extremely low. 11.5% only of residents of the *quartier* of Kampemba trust the police as security provider. In informal Kabetsha, this percentage is even lower: 8.6%. A large proportion of the local population of the commune can be labelled as sceptics, especially in low-income neighborhoods. In the *quartier* of Bogonga, 60.5% of residents believe that security is out of control and no institution can be trusted in ensuring protection. In the *quartier* of Kampemba, 50.3% of residents share this opinion.

On the backdrop of this pessimism, it may not come as a surprise that in all neighborhoods, with the exception of Kafubu, residents are unlikely to report a crime to the police. In the *quartier* of Kampemba, only 9.4% of crime are reported to the police. In many neighborhoods, like Kampemba and Kabetsha, residents tend to report crime to the *chefs de quartier* rather than to the police. In the *quartier* of Kampemba, 58.5% of reported crimes are reported to the *chefs de quartier*. The latter receive 47.1% of all reported burglaries in Kabetsha while the police get 23.5% only of cases. Despite their critical role in crime reporting and the future *forums de quartier*, the *chefs de quartier* are poorly trained, housed, and equipped.

## **Bipemba (Mbujimayi)**

Insecurity is higher in the eastern part of the commune of Bipemba, near the down-town area of Mbujimayi. Crime is associated with higher level of incivilities and rampant poverty. The group of neighborhoods named Debout Bipemba, at the north-eastern end of Bipemba, features the highest crime rates of the commune. 3-year burglary rates reach 42.5%; assault rates 8.3%. Aggressive youth gangs tend to congregate in this area and, besides provoking physical assaults, they generate a deep sense of insecurity among the population. During the day, 32.1% of the population feel unsafe walking in the streets of Debout Bipemba; during the night, this rate jumps to a 87.6% high. Quality of life in Debout Bipemba is declared very low by residents who point to a lack of social cohesion in the area. 77.4% of residents in this area believe they will be the target of a crime in the next 12 months, and 90.3% fear being assaulted in the streets.

At the opposite end of the commune, the western and more rural group of neighborhoods called Bisanga is comparatively safer and seems spared from the high rates of criminality that characterized the eastern and southern sections of Bipemba.

Policing is weak in the high-crime areas of Debout Bipemba and Makala. Residents see few police patrols walking their streets: 34.2% in Makala and 40.1% in Debout Bipemba. Prevention campaigns are few; police do not intervene rapidly in case of emergency; and residents complain the police lack proximity with the public. In safer Bisanga, the police get the highest marks of the commune in all dimensions of the *police de proximité*. Residents observe relatively often police patrols in their streets (55.3%) ; the police is seen as close to the public (70.8%); police intervenes rapidly when called in for an emergency (65.3%); and a majority of residents believe that police is fair in their neighborhood.

Facing insecurity and a weak policing, Bipemba residents tend to participate to collective programs of alert often managed by the *chefs de quartier*. 43.7% of residents of Butoka and 37.4% of residents of Debout Bipemba do participate to such programs.



Everywhere in Bipemba, residents favor reporting crime to the *chefs de quartier* rather than to the police. In Makala, 80% of burglaries are reported to the *chefs de quartier*; in Debout Bipemba, 76.3%; in Bisanga, 75%. Reporting to the police is the exception rather than the rule in the two communes of Mbujimayi studied. In high-crime areas such as Debout Bipemba, residents have more trust in youth self-defense groups to protect the population (22.5%) than in the police (19%). But the dominant opinion, in high-crime areas, is that no institution or informal group is in a position of ensuring adequate protection.

### **Muya (Mbujimayi)**

The western end of the commune of Muya –areas called Révélation and Lubilanji and situated near the down-town area -, host the middle class of Mbujimayi. Middle-income households make up 45% of the population of these areas. Being economically dynamic, this section of the Muya attracts youth seeking jobs in the informal economy. Quality of life is better than elsewhere in the communes studied, but security appears as a primary concern of residents. Assaults, sexual assaults, drugs, aggressive youth gangs, and excessive alcohol consumption concentrate in these areas. As a consequence, a sizable proportion of residents (30.3%) feels unsafe walking the streets of their neighborhood during the day. Social cohesion being lower than in other parts of the commune, collective initiatives to prevent crime are few and the *chefs de quartier* play a lesser role in security than elsewhere.

The Eastern part of Muya is economically marginalized and features high rates of unemployment since the bankruptcy of the MIBA, the main diamond extraction company that had been at the origin of the city and its economic growth during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These safer neighborhoods adhere more often to collective programs of prevention organized by the local *chefs de quartier*. Over 30% of residents do so. Residents of these areas report less crime to the police than in the western section of the commune. Starting from the central group of neighborhoods called Cardinal Mulala and moving to the eastern periphery, the police image suffers also lower rates of satisfaction than in the more urban west of the commune. In Cardinal Mulala, for instance, only 30.2%

of residents think the police is doing a good job in fighting criminality and a very low 16.2% think that the “*routière*”, the traffic police, does a good job.

Everywhere in the commune, a sizable portion of residents holds negative views on the evolution of policing. 52.2% of Cardinal Mulala residents believe policing is getting worse and 47.2% of Lubilanji share this opinion. This negative opinion is correlated with a sense that security is also deteriorating in Muya. Over 40% of residents of the commune of Muya believe security is declining in their neighborhood.

As this is the case in Bipemba, residents tend to believe that youth self-defense groups do better than the police to protect the population. This opinion is widespread in Révélation, Cardinal Mulala and the eastern neighborhoods of Muya. Police is perceived as relatively marginal to secure the safer but poorer eastern periphery of Muya.

## Recommendations

The authors of the diagnostic recommend that the contribution of the *chefs de quartier* to public security matters is acknowledged. Somewhat forgotten by the texts of the public security reform, the *chefs de quartier*, be it in Lubumbashi or in Mbujimayi, are the primary recipients of crime reports filed by residents. They also organize collective alarms systems and youth self-defense groups where social cohesion allows. The chair the sub-committees of public security coordinating security institutions and, with the reform, will also start to chair the public security forums that that will be consulted by the Local Councils of Security of Proximity (CLSP). These representatives of the civilian local government have the legitimacy, the information, and the formal capacity to create a consensus with civil society and federate action around local public security centered on prevention and partnership. This **acknowledgement should translate into support by policy texts, equipment and capacity-building.**

A **Priority Action Zones (PAZ) program combining urbanism and security** should prioritize informal and marginalized neighborhoods that display higher rates of criminality, incivilities and insalubrity that impact negatively on quality of life, safety and health. Such priority zones have been identified by the diagnostic as the southern neighborhoods of the Annexe belt, Bogonga, Kigoma and part of Kabetsha in Kampemba, Debout Bipemba in Bipemba, and the western neighborhoods of Muya.

Supporting **integration programs of street children** is identified as a driver for safer neighborhoods as street youth gangs double the likelihood of assaults in the streets of Lubumbashi and Mbujimayi.

A **multi-partner global program to address sexual violence** should be developed to curb the exceptionally high rates of sexual violence against females in the commune of Annexe. Specialized services of the police should be reinforced, become more mobile and cover better the territories where prevalence of sexual violence is high. NGOs need to revive discontinued programs to temporary shelter and accompany victims in the judicial process with adequate legal, social and medical services.

Reinforcing **police integrity and the *police de proximité*** should be a priority in the pilot zones. Complying with principles of deontology, but also increasing police visibility and its capacity to intervene in case of emergency in high-crime areas are likely to improve police image and trust in their capacity to protect citizen. The PAZ (Priority Action Zones) should be focus areas of the new policing.


Police should **improve their handling of complaints**, improve victim satisfaction, and consider establishing, in the longer run, a forensic identification to improve their investigations in case of burglary.

A **denser network of local police stations** should be considered as it would match public expectations. In parallel, in high-crime areas, police should reintroduce foot patrols that were abandoned several years ago. Police mobility with a 119-like call center should be a priority to target armed robberies that worsen security in higher-income areas.

Figure 1: Les communes étudiées de Lubumbashi



Figure 2: Les communes étudiées de Mbuji-Mayi





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